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TRIBUTE To
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS
The undersigned, who are presently judges and senior judges of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, again ex-
press our appreciation to the Chicago-Kent Law Review for reviewing
the work of this court. And we are especially pleased that the Review
decided to dedicate this issue to our former colleague and present Cir-
cuit Justice, the Honorable John Paul Stevens.
Judge Wood came to our court as Justice Stevens' successor, but
had come to know him before that time. All the rest of us served with
Justice Stevens here in the Seventh Circuit. We grew to know and ap-
preciate him through the day-to-day experience of working together,
studying, listening to oral arguments, exchanging views, agreeing and
dissenting. The association brought forth our high admiration.
We presume to speak also for colleagues no longer with us. We do
not hesitate to say that the feelings we express were shared by the late
Senior Judges J. Earl Major, John S. Hastings, Roger J. Kiley, and
Judge Otto Kerner.
Some of us had not really known Justice Stevens until we shared
the bench, and only then acquired knowledge of his earlier career as we
came to appreciate the quality of the judicial work for which it had so
admirably fitted him. In 1941, Justice Stevens graduated from the Uni-
versity of Chicago, a member of Phi Beta Kappa. In 1947, he ranked
first in his graduating law school class at Northwestern University
where he edited the Law Review. For the following year, Justice Ste-
vens had an introduction to the United States Supreme Court as law
clerk to Justice Wiley Rutledge.
Upon returning to Chicago, Justice Stevens entered private prac-
tice with Poppenhusen, Johnston, Thompson and Raymond, now
known as Jenner & Block. From 1952 until his appointment to this
court in 1970, Justice Stevens was a partner in the Chicago firm of
Rothschild, Stevens, Barry & Myers, specializing in an antitrust and
corporate practice.
Justice Stevens interrupted his practice at several points to perform
public legal service. In 1950, he served as an associate counsel for a
United States House of Representatives subcommittee studying mo-
nopoly and its impact on various businesses, including major league
baseball. From 1954 to 1955, Justice Stevens was a member of the At-
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torney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws. In
1969, he became general counsel to an Illinois special commission in-
vestigating allegations of judicial corruption. This investigation, in
which he served without compensation and which was believed by
many to be professionally hazardous, led to the resignation of two jus-
tices of the Supreme Court of Illinois.
During this period, Justice Stevens lectured at the University of
Chicago and Northwestern Law Schools and wrote numerous articles
in the antitrust field, earning a reputation as a scholar. Since becoming
a Justice, he has shared his knowledge and experience at the Aspen
Institute for Humanitarian Studies and the Salzburg Seminar in Amer-
ican Studies.
The intellectual independence and practical orientation developed
in his years as student, practitioner, and teacher served Justice Stevens
well on the Seventh Circuit bench. As colleagues, we can attest to his
judicious but nondoctrinaire mind. His opinions were closely reasoned
and carefully researched. Yet, they illustrate a certain maverick quality
and thus defy categorization under the traditional labels of conserva-
tive, moderate, centrist, liberal, or progressive. Justice Stevens' opin-
ions show an interesting duality: a reluctance to enlarge the scope of
judicial involvement in policy-making yet a willingness to expand the
concept of fairness.
In dissent, he was respectful but made his point. Justice Stevens
introduced an early dissent by saying: "Since I find myself out of step
not only with respected colleagues but also with a whole parade of re-
cent decisions, I shall explain at some length why I am convinced the
parade is marching in the wrong direction."' In another case, 2 Justice
Stevens criticized this court's decision in Roth v. Board of Regents,
3
later reversed by the United States Supreme Court,4 opening his dissent
with:
Two distinctions are decisive. The first is the distinction between
wise policy and a constitutional mandate; the second is the distinc-
tion between procedure and substance. Because these distinctions
are blurred in the majority opinion in Roth, as well as here, I believe
that these apparently reasonable and relatively innocuous decisions
have in fact planted a pernicious seed.5
Justice Stevens had barely arrived at the Seventh Circuit when he
i. United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2. Shirck v. Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971).
3. 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971).
4. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
5. 447 F.2d at 1028 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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participated in one of our rare en banc sessions. The majority refused
habeas relief to Father James Groppi, ordered imprisoned under a res-
olution of the Wisconsin legislature following a disruptive protest in
the state capitol.6 Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that there was a
denial of due process because the legislature had failed to give notice of
the charge, or an opportunity to present a defense.7 The United States
Supreme Court unanimously reversed.8
We attempt no comprehensive evaluation of Justice Stevens' five
years of effort on our court. Illustrations, however, of his impact on
jurisprudence are readily found. In Illinois State Employees Union v.
Lewis,9 Justice Stevens wrote: "While the patronage system is de-
fended in the name of democratic tradition, its paternalistic impact on
the political process is actually at war with the deeper traditions of de-
mocracy embodied in the First Amendment."' 0 Supported by a con-
currence, the panel reached a result consistent with his thought that a
non-policymaking state employee may not be discharged for refusing
to transfer his political allegiance from one political party to another."l
Lewis led to Burns v. Elrod.'2 Justice Stevens did not participate in the
Burns decision, and there was no majority opinion, but the decision
stands at least for the proposition that "a non-policymaking, nonconfi-
dential government employee can [not] be discharged or threatened
with discharge from a job that he is satisfactorily performing upon the
sole ground of his political beliefs." ' 3
Justice Stevens has made many contributions in the developing
field of prisoners' rights. In Harris v. Pate,'4 he recognized the diffi-
culty an incarcerated person may have in obtaining affidavits and re-
versed a summary judgment entered after denial of a continuance.
United States ex rel Miller v. Twomey' 5 prescribed due process re-
quirements for prison discipline. Justice Stevens observed that "liberty
protected by the due process clause may - indeed must to some extent
- coexist with legal custody pursuant to conviction. The deprivation
of liberty following an adjudication of guilt is partial, not total. A re-
6. Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1971).
7. Id. at 332 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8. 404 U.S. 496 (1972).
9. 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
10. 473 F.2d at 576.
11. Id. at 572.
12. 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1975), affd sub nom., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
13. Id. at 375.
14. 440 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1971).
15. 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
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siduum of constitutionally protected rights remain."' 6 Justice Stevens
repeated that language in his dissent in Meachum P. Fano,'7 a United
States Supreme Court decision. Justice Stevens pointed out his thought
that the Court was incorrectly narrowing the liberty interest of a pris-
oner entitled to due process protection.' 8
In Estelle v. Gamble,19 Justice Stevens dissented from an eight to
one decision of the Court which held that inadequate medical treat-
ment of prisoners may give rise to a cause of action under the eighth
amendment. 20 The plaintiff in Estelle, however, had failed to state a
claim against the prison medical director upon which relief could be
granted. Justice Stevens' forceful dissent made three points: first, that
the Court was being too strict in construing the prisoner's pro se com-
plaint; second, that the grant of certiorari had been inappropriate; and
third, that a claim of cruel and unusual punishment must be tested by
objective standards, rather than by the intent of the prison officials in-
volved.
21
A recent United States Supreme Court case, Bell v. Wolfish, 22 in-
volved restrictions and practices to which pre-trial detainees, not free
on bail, were subjected by the jail administration. The Court held that
these practices were not punishment and imposition of them therefore
did not deprive detainees of liberty without due process of law.23 Jus-
tice Stevens dissented, finding the Court's test for what is punishment
"unduly permissive," although he applauded the Court's recognition
that under the due process clause a detainee may not be punished prior
to an adjudication of guilt.
24
For those who have never had the experience, we can attest that it
is a remarkable and joyful feeling to have "Supreme Court lightning"
strike an admired colleague. It happened in this instance on the Friday
after Thanksgiving, a day not noted for high attendance. Those who
missed the excitement are still regretful.
Of course, we all shared the chores of circuit judges, the never end-
ing stream of criminal appeals, the hope of each of us that a patent case
would be assigned to someone else, the repetitious reviews of the
16. 479 F.2d at 712.
17. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
18. Id. at 232 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
20. Id. at 104.
21. Id. at 108-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
23. Id. at 541.
24. Id. at 584 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
JOHN PAUL STEVENS
NLRB, thepro se appeals of hapless people, and the duty of approving
the not-too-challenging details of district court jury selection plans,
needs for magistrate and referee positions, and the like. Thus, we espe-
cially treasure recollections of Justice Stevens' quizzical humor, his
habit of prefacing an incisive question to counsel with almost an apol-
ogy for asking it. We had, too, a little feeling of vicarious accomplish-
ment that our colleague did, and still does, fly his own airplane. We
recall our worry one summer when we learned that Justice Stevens was
to have heart surgery, the great success of which taught us to view such
operations with confidence.
Late in 1975, after he was sworn in as a Justice, we shared a dinner
in his honor. The speeches were mercifully informal, and after his re-
sponse, Justice Stevens handed each one a handwritten note of greeting
and reminiscence. Those who have had occasion to read his script will
realize that we do not keep the notes as calligraphy, but prize them for
other reasons.
As is always the case when a new Justice is appointed, Justice Ste-
vens' appointment brought forth an enormous amount of speculation.
There were predictions about how he could be expected to vote in cer-
tain types of cases and with whom he would align himself on the high
Court. Any of us when asked at that time were willing to make only
one prediction: the new Justice would be a hard working, sharp
minded, and very independent member of the Court. We had come to
appreciate his ability to focus on the dispositive issues and, if necessary,
to write separately to point them out. We were certain he would bring
that precision and independence (not to mention willingness to take on
extra work) to the United States Supreme Court.
Justice Stevens' few years on the Supreme Court bench have pro-
vided ample support for our first impressions. Of the eleven cases the
Court heard during his first week of oral argument, Justice Stevens
wrote opinions in seven. These seven, which included three majority
opinions, 25 one concurrence, 26 and three dissents, 27 were joined in by as
few as one and as many as eight other members of the Court. In one of
his dissents,28 he was joined by Justices Stewart and Blackmun, but in
25. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
26. Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94 (1976).
27. Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Colo-
rado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
28. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 821 (1976) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
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two others29 he dissented with Justices Brennan and Marshall. The
topics on which he wrote ranged from equal protection for aliens30 to
the antitrust liability of regulated utilities. 3' If others were surprised by
any of this, we were not.
These first opinions have been followed by some two hundred
more but the pattern has remained the same. The statistics compiled
by the Harvard Law Review at the end of each term of the United
States Supreme Court indicate that after his first full term on the Court,
Justice Stevens had written considerably more opinions than any other
Justice.32 This honor had previously gone to Justice Douglas, but Jus-
tice Douglas had achieved it, not surprisingly, by writing a great
number of dissents. 33 Justice Stevens, in an era of increased work by
all of the members of the Court, wrote more dissents in his first full
term than Justice Douglas wrote in his last, but Justice Stevens, in
marked contrast to Justice Douglas, also wrote more concurrences than
any other Justice.
34
Just a year after his elevation to the United States Supreme Court,
Justice Stevens spoke of the importance to the legal profession, the
courts, and the nation, of disagreeing without being disagreeable. 35
Justice Stevens' own ability to disagree with absolute courtesy and cor-
diality was well appreciated by those of us who sat with him and we are
certain it is equally appreciated by his new colleagues.
Despite Justice Stevens' tendency to write separately and his not
infrequent dissents, Justice Stevens has always agreed with each of his
colleagues more than he has disagreed, while at the same time retaining
his independence. The Harvard Law Review statistics again demon-
strate this. During the 1976-77 term, for example, Justice Brennan
aligned himself with Justice Rehnquist in only 36.8% of the cases which
they heard, but aligned himself with Justice Marshall in 93.6% of the
cases. Justice Rehnquist, in contrast to his tendency to disagree with
Justice Brennan, aligned himself with Chief Justice Burger in 78.4% of
the cases. Justice Stevens, no doubt to the surprise of many, agreed less
29. Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 533-38 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 516-23 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
31. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
32. Note, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 295 (1977).
33. Note, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 275 (1975).
34. In the 1977-78 term, Justice Powell wrote more concurrences, and slightly more opinions
in total, than Justice Stevens but Justice Stevens' pattern is still apparent. Note, The Supreme
Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 327 (1978).
35. Address by Justice John Paul Stevens, Illinois State Bar Association Centennial Dinner
(January 22, 1977),. printed in 65 ILL. B.J. 508 (1977).
JOHN PAUL STEVENS
often with the Chief Justice than with any other member of the Court.
But Justice Stevens still agreed with Chief Justice Burger over half
(51.4%) of the time. Nor was there any one member of the Court with
whom Justice Stevens could be predicted to agree. He agreed most
often with Justice Stewart, but that agreement occurred in only 62% of
the cases. The 1978 Harvard Law Review statistics merely confirm this
pattern. Even when the cases heard are divided into subject areas, such
as criminal cases or civil constitutional cases, Justice Stevens' indepen-
dence stands out. He does not align himself with any one Justice, or
group of Justices; nor is there anyone with whom he consistently dis-
agrees.
36
Even when he is writing a majority opinion, Justice Stevens tends
to be precise and to select narrow grounds for decision. He wrote for
the Court in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,3 7 holding invalid a regula-
tion of the Civil Service Commission barring non-citizens from federal
civil service employment. 38 Reading beneath the careful statement of
facts, one may sense the majority's unhappiness that highly qualified
persons were being excluded from the service because they were aliens.
But, of course, emotion is not an acceptable ground for decision.
Justice Stevens examined considerations which might support the
requirement complained of in Hampton. Assuming, without deciding,
that they would adequately support an explicit determination by Con-
gress or the President to exclude noncitizens from the federal service,
Justice Stevens concluded these considerations could not provide an
acceptable rationalization for such a determination by the Civil Service
Commission.39 As to one consideration which might have been a
proper foundation for the decision of the Commission, there was noth-
ing to indicate that this was a real as opposed to a hypothetical justifi-
cation.
It should be noted that the exact situation on which Hampton was
predicated did not survive for long. The President issued an executive
order requiring, with limited exceptions, that a civil service applicant
be a citizen or national.40 The order has been upheld by the courts. 4'
36. Note, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 329-30 (1978). For criminal
cases, the range of Justice Stevens' agreement is from 45.7% with Justice Rehnquist to 65.7% with
Justice Stewart. For civil constitutional cases, Justice Stevens' range of agreement is from 40%
with Justice White to 65.7% with Chief Justice Burger.
37. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
38. Id. at 116-17.
39. Id.
40. Exec. Order No. 11,935, 41 Fed. Reg. 37,301 (1976), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 3301 app., at
384 (1976).
41. Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905 (1979).
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In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,42 Justice Stevens wrote separately to
make an important historical point that would have otherwise gone un-
mentioned.43 There were four decisions in Zurcher. The first three fo-
cused primarily on whether the probable cause standards for obtaining
warrants to search the premises of persons not implicated in criminal
activity, specifically in newspaper offices, should be different from the
standards otherwise applicable. Justice Stevens' separate dissent
pointed out that the problem would not have arisen prior to the elimi-
nation of the "mere evidence" rule in Warden v. Hayden.44 In his
Zurcher dissent, Justice Stevens concluded:
In the pre-Hayden era, [documentary evidence] was routinely ob-
tained by procedures that presumed that the custodian would respect
his obligation to obey subpoenas and to cooperate in the investiga-
tion of crime. These procedures had a constitutional dimen-
sion . ..
A showing of probable cause that was adequate to justify the issu-
ance of a warrant to search for stolen goods in the 18th Century does
not automatically satisfy the new dimensions of the Fourth Amend-
ment in the post-Hayden era.
4 5
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United Slates,4
6
Justice Stevens, previously noted as an experienced antitrust lawyer,
wrote thoughtfully concerning the policies underlying the Sherman
Act, and the Act's application to a profession,47 expanding upon Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar.4 8 In Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc. ,49 Justice Stevens demonstrated that there is a limited area in
which expression can properly be classified on the basis of its content
for the purpose of regulation without offense to the first amendment.
50
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,5 Justice Stevens, writing for
the Court, was able to find the implication of a private remedy in a
statute which contained no express provision for one. With characteris-
tic candor he acknowledged a "strict approach" recently followed by
the Court on such questions and then meticulously explored all the rel-
evant tests which are part of that approach. 52 Our admiration is not
42. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
43. Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
45. 436 U.S. at 581-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
47. Id. at 686-96.
48. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
49. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
50. Id. at 70.
51. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
52. Id. at 717.
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dulled by the fact that Cannon reversed the decision of a panel of this
court.
5 3
Justice Stevens' willingness to depart from tradition was exempli-
fied by his dissent in Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.54 The
majority in Eastlake upheld a city charter requirement that any change
in land use agreed to by the city council be approved by a referen-
dum.5 5 Relying very heavily on state court decisions in the area, Jus-
tice Stevens argued for recognition of a difference between the
legislative character of general zoning enactments and an administra-
tive character of a decision on a change as to one parcel, applied for by
the owner. The referendum device, in his view, was an unreasonable
method of decision in the latter type and a denial of due process.
56
Justice Stevens also has written critically of the practice of filing
dissents from denials of certiorari, pointing out the very limited signifi-
cance of a denial of certiorari, and suggesting that dissents therefrom
are unnecessary and potentially misleading. 57 Justice Stevens main-
tains an independent voice.
We have enjoyed thinking about our former colleague and current
friend in preparing this tribute which, because of our feeling toward
him, we regard as inadequate. We cherish our recollections and enjoy
our too rare opportunities to be together at judicial conferences and the
like. And we consider with pride the record he is continuing to build as











53. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976).
54. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
55. Id. at 679.
56. Id. at 695 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 940, 942-46 (1978).
* Senior Judge F. Ryan Duffy had approved the text of this tribute before his death on
August 16, 1979.
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